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PRIVACY IN WELFARE:
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND JUVENILE JUSTICE
JOEL F. HANDLER* AND MARGAPiET K. ROSENHEmmt
At the risk of stating the obvious, we may observe at the outset that the sensitive
areas of privacy appear to have different boundaries depending upon one's status in
society. Poor and otherwise dependent persons, however defined at a given moment,
are likely to be less secure in enjoyment of "private personality" than persons in other
social classes. Persons whose dependency arises out of financial necessity lack re-
sources to interpose the customary screens around their private activities and to keep
themselves shielded from the prying eyes of others. Yet the lesser protection of privacy
does not stem merely from lack of the things that money will buy. It also results
from a peculiar vulnerability of the needy and dependent to official or quasi-official
inquiry and surveillance. The institution of protective governmental programs is
frequently accompanied by an authority to investigate and control the clientele's
behavior which is inapplicable to other groups. Thus, to the familiar competing in-
terests that affect the scope of the privacy individuals enjoy must be added society's
interest in ascertaining that the goals of protection and support, incorporated in an
ever-widening spectrum of governmental welfare programs, are being carried forward.
How this task is currently accomplished and what guiding principles of accommoda-
tion of private and social values might be stated are the two topics we have set out
to discuss.
In one sense, of course, the questions to be considered are not new. For as long as
government has undertaken to supply food, shelter, medical care, or guidance and
control to the incompetent, to name obvious functions, there have existed the issues
with which we shall be dealing. Unlike the newer conflict between the demands of
science and those of personality,1 the issues arising out of welfare functions are not
so much the product of modern technology as of an ancient tension between charitable
instincts and an interest in public efficiency.2 The latter concern for proper limita-
tions on public support, we may note, is often affected by discernible resentment of
dependency on the part of those who are tapped to offer the support and by the
view that society should tell dependents how to live and behave. Notwithstanding
the venerability of these basic issues, it can be argued that the very recognition of
0A.B. 1954, Princeton University; LL.B. 1957, Harvard University. Professor of Law, University
of Wisconsin.
t J.D. 1949, University of Chicago. Professor, School of Social Service Administration, University of
Chicago. Editor, JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD: THE JUVENILE COURT IN TRANsiTION (I962).
1See, e.g., Ruebhausen & Brim, Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 COLUS!. L. REv. XI84 (1965).
' See generally EVELINE M. BuRNs, SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC POLICY (1956); HILARY M. LEYEW-
DECKER, PROBLEMS AND POLICY IN PUBLIC ASSIsrANCE (1955); KARL DE SCHWEiNITZ, ENGLAND'S ROAD "tO
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newly-emerging conflicts between the public interest and the privacy claims of indi-
viduals lends a special pertinence to examining the measures of inquiry, observation,
and control imposed on dependent persons. Such an undertaking can serve at least
two ends: it may stimulate a re-examination of practices whose antiquity does not
necessarily confer legitimacy, and it may suggest analogies of use to other fields
where the conflicting values at stake are unusually difficult to balance.
I
TE ScoPE OF GOVERNMENTAL WELFARE ActiVITIES
In modern terms, "welfare" programs signify a range of organized schemes for the
provision of income, work, counseling, and other specialized aid (such as medical
care), as well as the state's assumption of superparental responsibilities for children
and the mentally incompetent. We may include in addition the supplying of housing
and education. Excluded in the common use of "welfare" is one protective function
par excellence-the preservation of law and order. Yet, while law enforcement and
the operation of correctional facilities will seldom be confused with welfare activities,
there is a? class for whom welfare and law enforcement merge-minors in the juvenile
justice system.4 And in connection with adults the distinctions are sometimes fuzzy.5
Some common threads unite these disparate elements. One is relief of suffering;
another, the prevention of injury, to individuals as a matter of humanity or to the
state as an assumed consequence of letting unguided or destructive behavior continue
unchecked; still another, the desire to rehabilitate, to prepare people to face their life
situations.
One scarcely needs to be reminded where the emphasis is presently placed in dis-
bursing governmental welfare, as defined. Provision of income is the paramount func-
tion. Specialized health activities and education are not too far behind. But even
lesser functions, as measured by cost, are consequential in terms of numbers of persons
affected, expenditures involved, and social attitudes shaped by their very existence.0
A wide variety of governmental undertakings, then, may be characterized
"welfare." Sometimes particular programs are focused on a sharply defined popula-
tion and are constructed to meet a single objective. In many others, however, the
objectives are multiple, not necessarily consistent with one another, and occasionally
hard to identify. In the latter instances it should not surprise us if the target popula-
tions are less well-defined and the methods of administration more varied. And to
the extent that specific welfare programs depend on discretionary administration,
'See Merriam, Social Welfare Expenditures, 1964-65, Social Security Bull., Oct. 1965, pp. 3"5.
'See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THm BORDERLAaN OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 43-49 (1964); Tappan, Juridical
and Administrative Approaches to Children with Problems, in JusTICE FOR THE CHILD 144 (Rosenhcim ed.
1962).
'See, e.g., ALLEN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 5-7; Rosenheim, Vagrancy Concepts in Welfare Law, 54
CAuF L. REV. 511 (1966).
"Merriam, supra note 3, at 4; cf. Titmuss, The Role of Redistribution in Social Policy, Social Security
Bull., June z965, p. 14.
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either in initial determination 'of the population to be served or in the types of
conditions imposed in the course of service, we can expect to uncover a substantial
number of practices which it is useful to discuss in the context of privacy.
Perhaps the point will be sharpened by illustration. The comparison is commonly
drawn between social insurance and public assistance as alternative ways of pro-
viding income maintenance. Both approaches basically seek the same goal-elimina-
tion of destitution through regular governmental income payments. Social insurance,
in this country a twentieth-century innovation, is associated with a detailed statutory
definition of eligibility, a statutorily prescribed benefit schedule, and, often, a con-
tributory scheme of financing. Public assistance, by contrast, is a modern-dress
version of poor relief. As such, its disbursement depends on administrative deter-
mination of need within broad guides set forth by statute, the authorization of pay-
ments designed to meet specific individual needs as they arise, and support from
sources of general taxation-federal, state, and local. The crucial difference between
the two approaches centers on the concept of need. In the case of social insurance,
need is presumed to arise;7 the payments made are presumed to be sufficient to
guard against the destitution of persons not subject to extraordinary hazards8 It is
precisely the unusual circumstance to which public assistance is oriented in its pro-
claimed concern to relieve individual need Simply because no legislative deter-
mination of social policy can cover all contingencies, the design and administration of
public assistance necessarily concentrate on the unique personal circumstances of the
recipients. To fulfill the commendable goal of relief of a person's suffering requires
an intimate knowledge of his appetites and needs. The very approach of public
assistance demands varying degrees of exposure of the applicants' lives and affairs to
those who administer it. Needs, exposure, and regulation supply the basis of govern-
mental intervention and generate the privacy questions.
II
SoME EXAMPLES OF PRIVACY IssuEs IN PUBLIC AssrsTANrE
We have already alluded to the fundamental factor that gives rise to issues of
private personality in the field of public assistance, namely, the pervasive requirement
of establishing need. The requirement applies at the point of initial request;,and it is
continuing, for as an individual's or family's situation changes, the responsibility of
government is altered. Absent need in its technical sense, the potential or actual
7 EvEmLsw M. BuRNs, THm Am.mc. w SocrAL SEcuRrry SYSTm 35-36 ('949). For a useful dis-
cussion of the two approaches, see tenBroek & Wilson, Public Assistance and Social Insurance-A Norma-
tive Evaluation, i U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 237 (1954).
8 it was the clear intention of the framers of the Social Security Act to establish social insurance as the
first line of defense against want, relegating public assistance to a minor role. Id. at 238. See generally
Burns, Social -Security in Evolution: Toward What?, 39 Soc. SERVIcE REV. 529 (1965).
'The circumstances may be unusual in the sense that the risk to mintenance of income does not
readily lend itself to coverage by social insurance (e.g., "the risk of family break~up attributable to causes
other than the death of the breadwinner") or involves unpredictable costs (e.g., medical care). Id. at 135.
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recipient is disqualified from receiving support. The critical question, therefore,
concerns how need is established and re-established. What are the customary rules
and what evidence have we as to their administration?
The primary tool for need determination is the so-called means test. Long excori-
ated for its humiliating dehumanizing aspects, it has been a key feature of poor relief
and public assistance in the United States.1" The modern administration of the
means test takes different forms, as best we can determine, depending upon what
state and what program we are talking about or upon who is charged with applying
the test." A few generalizations can be hazarded just the same.
As a rule, the poorer states are under greater pressure to administer public aid
with stringency. In all the states, rich and poor, a variety of strategies may be
employed to meet politically-demanded results. 2 The scope of coverage under a
welfare program obviously sets the potential limits of charges on public funds. By
restricting the definition of classes of eligible persons a state may control the total
caseload of persons reliant on governmental support under that particular program.'
Thus, by statute it may define mothers eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) to exclude those with a man in the house, or it may accomplish
this or similar ends through administrative regulation.' 4 Another strategy to control
expenditures is to adopt a "paper" standard of living to set the theoretical limits of
need but to make payment of grants at less than one hundred per cent of the state's
own standards. 5 Obviously, grants based on eighty per cent of need will encompass
more people than will full grants, given the same size appropriation.
A third prominent strategy is the use of stringent standards of means-test admin-
istration. 6 This entails an exhaustive check of income and resources available to the
claimant, and may lead the welfare administration to count on resources that are
more theoretical than real; it also includes, by the nature of public assistance, continu-
1 0 EVELINE M BURNS, SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 64-65 (956); Mandelker, The Need Test
in General Assistance, 41 VA. L. REV. 893 (1955); Note, Abolish the Means Test for Old Age Assistance,
17 Soc. SERv. REV. 213 (1943).
"
1 See Bentrup, The Profession and the Means Test, Social Work, April 1964, p. 15.
12 Compare WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN (1965).
"
3 A good example of this strategy is found in the segment of Aid to Families of Dependent Children
providing especially for unemployed parents (AFDC-UP). Only 18 states have adopted AFDC-UP, with
definitions of unemployment which vary considerably in liberality. The jurisdictions without AFDC-UP
may provide support to unemployed parents under general assistance to the extent that able-bodied and
unemployed men are not ineligible thereunder for aid. Even if the parents are eligible, general
assistance grants are less satisfactory in terms of amount and eligibility conditions than those provided
under the federally-aided categories. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE REP'T No. 39, CHARACTERISTICS OF GENERAL ASSISTANCE passim (1959).
1" See, e.g., CENTER ON SOCIAL WELARE POLICY AND LAw, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF SOCIAL
WORK, MEMORANDUM ON SOCIAL WELFARE LAW "TEsTINO" FUNCTION 3-5 (1965); NATIONAL ASs'N os
SOCIAL WORKERS, METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON CHAPTER, THE PUBLIC WELFARE CRISIS IN THE NATION'S
CAPITAL 40-43 (1963).
"
5 Report of the Advisory Council on Public Assistance, S. Doc. No. 93, App. B, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
54-75 (i96o). See also id. at 75-87.
1" See EVELINE M. BURNS, SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 65-66 (1956); Mandelker, supra note
10.
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ing scrutiny of the client's private affairs so as to detect any change in needs or avail-
able sources of income. A further aspect of means-test administration entails the im-
plementation of policies promoting rehabilitation of the chronically dependent.
Restoration to self-support, a goal appropriate only to those physically and mentally
capable of work, is an unexceptionable objective of public policy. Execution of the
rules designed to bring about restoration to productivity, however, involves the risk
that the possibility of work, administratively determined, may be transformed into a
resource disqualifying the recipient from future support.' 7 Whatever policy argu-
ments are brought to bear for and against self-support and self-betterment tests as an
intrinsic part of public assistance policy, the over-all point to be noted here is simply
that the concept of individual need demands a case-by-case decision on applicability of
these tests to particular recipients.
Choice of political strategy is dependent on many factors. Cost-reducing tech-
niques may be employed in all income-support programs or in none. Furthermore,
the legislative and administrative base of programs may affect their impact. Notable
differences exist, for instance, between the general assistance form of public assistance
and the Social Security categorical aids. The two forms are distinguished by the
standard of relief afforded, conditions of eligibility as to residence, responsibility of
relatives and "disregards," geographical coverage, and administrative procedure.
Almost universally, the categorical programs provide a more inclusive and dignified
form of assistance. s Any privacy issues, therefore, that are identified in the federal
grant-in-aid categories may be assumed to exist in general assistance administration as
well. The difficulties of documenting these issues, however, gives us license to extract
illustrations from any of the public assistance programs, federal-state or state and local.
A. The Means Test and Its Implementation
What must an applicant for public assistance do to satisfy the conditions of
eligibility? He must satisfy the welfare authority that his personal and financial status
conforms to elaborate official regulations for establishing eligibility. And he must
submit to verification of the facts he alleges. By and large, the initial application for
assistance, which is predicated on a supposed gap between income and resources, on
the one hand, and the needs of the claimant and his dependents, on the other, suffices
as a basis for payment of a grant only at a time of pressing emergency.
Various methods of establishing eligibility are used. Residence is established by
inquiry of neighbors and merchants; rent is verified by receipt or inquiry of the land-
lord; utilities, in the same manner unless, as in some areas, a special billing procedure
is used which immediately identifies the customers so listed as public aid recipients.
Family relationships are verified, when possible, by checks of official records. The
possibilities of securing support from family members legally obligated to contribute
"' Cf. NATIONAL As'N oF SocIAL WoRmots, op. cit. supra note 14, at 32-35.
18 See EVELINE M. BURNS, TaE Aamc sN SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM 39-40 (1949)-
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to the maintenance of public charges must, according to most state laws, be ex-
hausted 9
Furthermore, by the nature of public assistance, the task of determining eligibility
is never-ending. Unlike the duty to pay income taxes, which calls for calculating
taxable income accumulated over a prescribed period of time, the obligation of the
recipient to report changes in status that alter his needs or his income or resources is
continuing. For administrative purposes, enforcement of this obligation is discharged
through periodic checks by welfare authorities,20 but the recipient carries the burden
of reporting when his circumstances change, else he is liable to penalties including
prosecution for fraud, permanent or temporary termination of his grant, or withhold-
ing from future grants the excess deemed to have been paid out in the past.' Having
satisfied the authority of his initial eligibility the client must regularly submit to a
truncated version of the same process. Furthermore, because of the requirement to
report changed circumstances he can be requested to furnish explanations of in-
consistencies in his own statements or of the allegations of third parties that bear
upon his eligibility. "Failure to comply" suffices to close a case,22 and this general
term presumably comprehends insufficient explanation of eligibility factors related
to income as well as as unwillingness to accept a work referral' or other manifesta-
tions of intractable behavior that bar public assistance 4
Emphasis on eligibility determination, as a strategy for controlling caseloads
and hence public expense, has produced bizarre rules and practices. The most notable
is the well-publicized "midnight raid" or "early morning visit," a clear example of
governmental intrusion into private life. Special investigators are commonly em-
ployed to go without prior notification to the homes of public aid recipients to deter-
mine whether conditions of eligibility are being violated. The existence of unstated
resources may be substantiated by such procedures. Characteristically, the agency
selects for investigation AFDC clients whose eligibility turns on absence of the male
parent. The object of the raid is to discover a "man in the house" or "substitute
2" IEYENDEcxER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 2r6; Burns,. What's Wrong With Public Welfare?, 36 Soc.
Saav. REv. III (x962). See generally LEYENDECKER, op. it. supra note 2, at 215-35. It should be
noted that relatives' responsibility provisions extend the means test to relatives of the applicant, thus
creating privacy issues for relatives as well as recipients..
" U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRA-
TON pt. IV, § 2230 [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK]. States are required to redetermine eligibility
at least every three months in AFDC-UP, every six months in other AFDC cases, and every twelve months
in other programs.
" CENTER ON SOCIAL ,VELFARE POLICY AND LAW, op. it. supra note 14, at 8-ig; statutes and cases
cited in Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347, 1351-53
(1963).
"See BUREAU oF FAmmy SERVICE Div., U.S. DEa'T OF HEaLTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REASONs FOR
OPENING AND CLOSING PUBLIC ASSISTANCE CASES, JULY-DEc. x964 (1965).
"
5 Most states require acceptance of work referrals as a condition of eligibility for "employable" per-
sons. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, § 605.3 (1965) (applicable to AFDC).4 For example, failure to cooperate with law enforcement agencies in locating absent parents for
enforcement of support obligations. See SWEET, THE ROLE OF THE STATE SOCIAL WELFARE BOARD IN THE
ADmrNIsTRATIoN OF THE ANC PRoORAm IN CALIFORNIA 49-62 (Report to Fact-Finding Committee on Labor
and Welfare, California Senate, 196i).
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parent," whose presence, depending on the jurisdiction, either precludes giving assis-
tance altogether or gives rise to an inference of support,25 which, of course, the public
assistance agency is obligated to investigate and to take into account in determining
the unmet budgetary need. Occasionally, the caseworkers assigned to welfare recipi-
ents are asked to undertake this kind of investigation instead of a special unit.
Whatever machinery is employed the common element in these investigative prac-
tices is surprise.26 Whether the raids are timed for midnight, or dawn, they are in-
tended to take the recipient unaware at a time of day when it is most likely that
"true" family living patterns will be uncovered.
The analogy between this practice and prohibited practices in the criminal law is
easy to see. In an extended analysis by Reich, arguments have been made favoring
application of constitutional search and seizure doctrines to restrict midnight raid
practices." Under his analysis, evidence that is garnered in the raids would be in-
admissible in administrative hearings on suspension or denials of grants, but such
an after-the-fact remedy, he concludes, is insufficient, for it fails to bar the practice
of investigation. He would induce the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
to rule out of conformity with federal law, state public assistance plans that coun-
tenance illegal practices?' It now appears his arguments, and the chorus of voices
approving them, have produced results. Practices in some localities have been revised
already; federal "state-plan" requirements mandate investigatory techniques that meet
standards of individual dignity and legality.29
The case against this particular form of government intrusion into private life is
compelling. Yet the control of illegal practices is apt to be as frustrating here as it
appears to be in criminal law.30 That is to say, the pressure to sustain a productive
type of investigatory technique is persistent. Elimination of these admittedly repre-
hensible midnight raid practices would seem- to require -adoption of reasonably
effective replacements. If we grant that society is willing to pay a certain price in
efficiency for investigations that conform to standards of fairness, and thereby preserve
other overriding values, we still must ask what substitutes are open that accommodate
both the values of individual dignity and the effective administration of popularly-
devised welfare programs.
On the surface, it appears that the privacy of persons subjected to a means test is
significantly curtailed as compared to other recipients of governmental largess and,
further, that the programs that employ the test today are those providing income
25 Bm.L, op. cit. supra note 12, at 76-92; CENTER ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AND LAW, OP. Ct. supra
note 14, at 3-4; Sparer, Social Welfare Law Testing, Prac. Law., April 1966, pp. 33, 15-18.
"' BEa., op. cit. supra note 12, at 88.
" Reich, supra note 23, at 3347-55.
"Id. at 1347-55, 1358-59. See also CErr. ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AND LAW, op. cit. supra
note 34, at 20.
29J ANDBOOK pt. IV, §§ 2220(l), 223o(3), effective July 1, 3967.
o See Handler, Controlling Offidal Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CAIF. L. Ray. 479 (3966);
cf. WA EE R, LAFAvE, AaRaST: THE DECsIoN To TAxE A SusPECr INTO CUSTODY (x965). -
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maintenance to a group of disfavored persons. This in turn affects administration.
The argument is a familiar one-that the commonly employed legal and adminis-
trative principles of investigation and control are inherently discriminatory and hence
improper, possibly on constitutional groundsO' But how does means-test administra-
tion compare with other forms of public administration more widely applied?
Cursory examination of the income tax, which we have chosen for its magnetic
attachment to the negative income tax proposals,3 2 indicates that all persons in the
United States are subject to a considerable amount of governmental investigation
into their private affairs vis-a-vis the taxpaying obligation. Those subject to tax
must reveal all income that is subject to tax, and all expenses that they wish to offset.
They must be prepared to produce detailed records to substantiate their claims.
The penalties for failure to report and for omissions may be high. The income tax
is indeed a kind of means test in the sense that its applicability and rates discriminate
among the various levels of net income, exacting proportionately more from persons
with more to report. Yet for all its imperfections the income tax has not been widely
attacked as an intrusion into private affairs.
The differences, of course, are important. The assistance-type means test goes
further in its demands of personal revelation. It sweeps into determination of need
all aspects of income and resources, whereas the taxable base for the income tax may
be shaped in part with an eye to administrative cost and to personal dignity. It is a
continuing and not an annual or quarterly affair. And its mechanics are more
objectionable in personal terms. To take one's word at face value, which is common
practice in income-tax administration, is the exception in determining need for
assistance purposes. The scale of tax, unlike the scale of payments to recipients, is set
by statute applicable nationwide. No one falls into a one hundred per cent bracket,
the fate of recipients who earn or receive income since it is fully deducted from their
needs 33 And so on.
The important point to note, however, is that a test of relative wealth or ability
to pay is not confined to public assistance although the offensive form that it takes
there is probably unique. The question then remaining is whether this special
variety-the means test-is reasonable. Is there any explanation beyond historical
accident to support it? At the heart of the matter lies the nature of the social
31 See generally tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law (pts. I-I1), 16 STAN. L. REV. 257,
900 (1964); 17 STAN. L. REv. 614 (1965).
32MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 161-76 (I962); Schwartz, A Way to End the Means
Test, Social Work, July x964, p. 3, in POVERTY IN AMERICA 481 (Ferman ed. 1965).
"s It is ironic that whereas earnings may be deducted in toto from the grant, many states do not pay
grants that meet in full their own standards of need. See text accompanying note 15 supra. Recent
amendments to the public assistance titles have liberalized the income "disregards" permitted under state
plans. See, e.g., Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, § io6(b), 76 Stat. 188 (r962), as amended, Social
Security Amendments of 1965, 79 Stat. 423, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6o2(a)(7) (Supp. 1965). With the exception
of the Aid to the Blind program and payments made under titles I and II of the Economic Opportunity Act
to public assistance recipients or their families, the exemption of earnings and other income is optional to
the states. Relatively few have fully availed themselves of the latitude permitted under federal law.
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responsibility that governmental agencies are called on to discharge. In a work-
oriented society the objective of income maintenance, broadly speaking, is to support
those who cannot work, for personal or socially desirable reasons, and those who can
work but cannot find a job. The governmental obligation begins and ends with
those somehow prevented from working or unable to maintain minimum living
standards though employed. The principle is clear, but its application is troublesome,
as numerous commentators have remarked. If the principle is justifiable as social
policy, then it follows that a test of need can be defended as a method of imple-
menting it.
Criticism of the means test in fact hits at punitive and petty policies. It seems
to be leaving its mark, as evidenced by recent administrative and statutory changes.
The step toward simplified budgeting methods and use of affidavits to replace the
detailed investigation and verification of need is one significant signJ" Increasing
exemptions of income and resources permitted under federal law is another, " and the
publicity attendant on the various guaranteed annual income proposals3 ' is a third
indication of dissatisfaction with present income maintenance schemes, including pub-
lic assistance. Clearly the field is ripe for experimentation.
Nevertheless, the urgency of changing means-test administration ought not to be
confused with the "reasonableness" of a means test per se. Discriminations based on
income are not only reasonable, they are essentialV7 No one has yet proposed a
blanket measure of need that will wholly eliminate investigation into individual cir-
cumstances. Neither family allowances, negative income tax plans, nor expanded
forms of social insurance will protect all persons from experiencing suffering in the
exceptional cases that are bound to arise. Some additional provision for the unique
and unexpected will be required. The popular alternatives to public assistance laws
and procedures will not eliminate extended investigation in all cases. They are likely,
however, to produce two desirable effects: further shrinkage of the residual needy
population to eliminate all but truly exceptional cases, and altered methods of
administration. The former requires and is well-suited to legislative action, while
the latter calls primarily for changes within the welfare bureaucracy itself, changes
to which statutory directives and case adjudication make a limited, albeit occasionally
vital, contribution.
" See, for example, New York City's well-publicized step to accept applications for assistance based on
affidavits, commented on favorably in N.Y. Times, March 22, 1966, p. 40, col. I. Effective July 1, 1967,
federal policy requires states to rely on the categorical assistance client as primary source of information
limiting verification of conditions of eligibility to "what is reasonably necessary to assure that expenditures
under the program will be legal." HANDBOOK Pt. IV, § 2220(5). And see WHITE, SIMPLIFIED METHons
FOR DETERMINING NEEDS (Bureau of Family Service Div., U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare,
1964).
3579 Stat. 48 (1965), 42 U.S.C.A. § 302(a)(io)(A) (Supp. 1965); 79 Stat. 423 (1965), 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 6D2 (Supp. 1965); 77 Stat. 51 (1963), 42 U.S.C. § 1102 (1964).
"0 See, e.g., EcoNomic REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 114-15 (1966); I NATIONAL COIM'N oN TECHNOLOGY,
AUTOMATION, AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS, REPORT, TECHNOLOGY AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 39-41 (r966).
"'For extended consideration of means-test-type issues, among others, arising under negative income
tax proposals, see Klein, Some Basic Problems of Negative Income Taxation, z966 Wis. L. REv. 776
(1966).
LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
B. Control of Personal Conduct
With eligibility established, the recipient is now presumably entitled to his grant.
Federal law imposes, with respect to the categorical programs, certain state-plan
requirements that are prerequisite to obtaining federal matching funds. Require-
ments relevant to the recipient's freedom of choice center not only on the determina-
tion of need outlined above but also on conditions attached to payment of the grant
itself. Under the categories, grants are based on a budget that covers most minimal
requirements for living"s (not merely a selected few necessities, which were so
often the focus under local and state programs of outdoor relief prior to enactment
of the Social Security Act) and must be paid out in cashY0 The concept of money
payment significantly differentiates public assistance as we have known it in the
categorical programs since 1935 from old-style poor relief. Making payments in cash
can be justified for administrative convenience. And money payments can be
explained to symbolize society's conviction that in the majority of cases financial want
stems from factors beyond individual control; at least, such was a popular view during
the Depression. The policy also finds justification in an often-asserted belief that
management of money aids the psychologically dependently inclined person to assert
initiative and self-control, whereas relief in kind serves to reinforce dependent
tendencies.40 Beneath the arguments about the form aid should take-cash or kind-
lies a sense of distaste for differentiating the poor as to their source of income by
exposing them to food lines, placing distinctive clothing on their backs, and otherwise
subjecting them to the indignities of daily identification. To be poor is bad enough;
to be identified to the world as a pauper or welfare client is too much. It smacks
of "badging," a practice long ago abandoned in original form but subtly perpetuated
even now.41 And badging interferes with the urgent personal "need both to share
and to withhold" communications from our fellow men.42
Money payments, therefore, are highly valued in any welfare scheme that strives to
protect the privacy of the poor. The exceptions should be narrow; the original
"Report of the Advisory Council on Public Assistance, supra note 15, at 76; see also State Responsi-
bility for Definiteness in Assistance Standards, Social Sec. Bull., March 1947, P. 29.
S9 LEYENDECKER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 175-78; HANDBOOK Pt. IV, § 5100-42. According to one
authority, "the unrestricted money payments principle was written into ADC in 1935 not because of any
special consideration to ADC but primarily due to the fact that the legislators were thinking of old age
assistance. They did not want the federal program to encourage the expansion of almshouses and county
homes for the aged." Cohen, Factors Influencing the Content of Public Welfare Legislation, in PaocEEn-
INGS, NATIONAL CNFERENcE ON SOCIAL WoRx, SOCIAL WELFARE FORUM 250 (1954).
"o CHa.o'rrE TowLE, CommoN HUMAN NEEDs (1965).
'± Badging the poor, instituted in 1563 along with compulsory almsgiving for poor relief, was meant
to curb the abuses of begging, and also perhaps to serve a deterrent function by stigmatizing the poor.
Welfare clients today are identified as such to landlords, merchants, utility personnel, and so forth, by the
requirements of eligibility investigation and redetermination. See text at note 59 supra. But see note 34
supra. Taking advantage of surplus food also requires identifying oneself to the world as poor. See
comments in CMZENS' COaM[M-rzE FOR CHILDREN op Naw YORE, LiFr AT TE Borrom (1966): "Anyone
receiving welfare is automatically eligible for surplus food.... People wanting surplus food often must
line up outside the depot, regardless of weather or shame at being on a bread line.... ." (Not paginated.)
"' Ruebhausen & Brim, supra note x, at i189.
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scheme under the Social Security Act limited them to situations in which appointed
guardians and conservators would receive the funds.43 A shift in recipient popula-
tion,44 however, may produce a reshuffling of social values. The introduction of
protective payment provisions" reflects a congressional decision that the disadvantage
of persistent mismanagement of funds by recipients outweighs the values of a
recipient's having unrestricted choice in expending money payments (to the limit
of the modest grants, of course).
Under any scheme of income maintenance the gross mismanagers present painful
choices to the policymakers. Public assistance-and especially AFDC, with its adult
population drawn from an age group presumptively employable-is vulnerable to
criticism that lack of restrictions on expenditures increases waste-and taxes. It is
especially vulnerable today when the Great Depression is a mere flickering memory
for many legislators and is soon to be an occurrence taken mainly on faith for new
generations. The middle class, which once looked on public assistance as offering
it salvation from want with some degree of dignity, wonders about the thrift and
prudence of the residual risks presently receiving assistance, those persons "under-
employed" or unemployed or, for any number of reasons, unprotected by the matured
system of Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance. To be sure, improvidence
in personal expenditures may be a fault of OASDI beneficiaries, too, but the difference
between social insurance and public assistance shields the beneficiaries from critical
attention. Theirs is a contributory scheme; since they are said to have "earned" the
benefits, it is theirs to spend at will (barring the extreme for which outside oversight
is specifically authorized). Furthermore, because an average need is assumed, entitle-
ment to insurance benefits entails none of the intimate budgeting process character-
istic of public assistance, which allots so many dollars to food, so many to clothing, to
personal supplies, and so forth, and thus conveys the implicit judgment that marked
deviation from this carefully allocated division of expenditures is in itself evidence of
mismanagement. But most important of all, perhaps, the privacy of the insurance
beneficiary in this regard is protected significantly by the feeling that he belongs to
a worthier class than the assistance recipient and should not be subjected to intensive
personal scrutiny.46
Thus, in public assistance, the recipients are vulnerable to discretionary controls,
and of all the categories of recipients none is more vulnerable than those receiving
AFDC. It was, for instance, the initial program to adopt protective payments. In
AFDC the purpose is care of children; extravagant adults do an injustice to their
'aSocial Security Amendments of 1958, § 511(a), 72 Stat. io5 (1958), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 131
(1964) (authorizing payment to and management of expenditure of grant by judicially-appointed iepre-
sentative of recipient).
"See Perkins, AFDC in Review, .936-z962, Welfare in Review, Nov. 1963, p. 1.
' 79 Star. 415, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3o6, 12o6, 1355, 1385 (Supp. 1965). See Note, z965 Amendments to
the Social Security Act on Protective Payments to Aged, Blind, and Disabled, Welfare in Review, Dec.
1965, P. 26.
"'See generally tenBroek & Wilson, supra note 7.
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dependent minors by imprudent patterns of expenditure. Protective payments, food
stamps, rent screening justified within a "better housing" campaign-all are measures
that can be used in AFDC and justified as positive aids for children. All equally
produce side-effects; restricting personal choice and guarding the public purse are
two examples. But the same paternalistic policies erupt in other programs. Wilkie
v. O'Connor,7 the 1941 New York case refusing assistance to an aged man who
chose to sleep under a barn in a nest of rags, resisting all efforts to locate more
conventional housing, puts the problem well. Using the gratuity theory, the court
held that assistance might properly be predicated on acceptance of conditions related
to his health and well-being. "One would admire his independence if he were not so
dependent, but he has no right to defy the standards and conventions of civilized
society while being supported at public expense."4
Another illustration of the fusion of behavior control and income maintenance
goals is found in policies respecting the morality of AFDC mothers. The catalyst
of most cases presenting this issue is the "suitable-home" policy, which permits pay-
ments only to those parents with dependent children, otherwise eligible, who main-
tain such a home. Although in theory this policy can extend to other caretakers and
to other kinds of personal behavior, in fact its application runs primarily to mothers
whose sexual conduct elicits community disapproval4 9 Disapproved behavior is
usually inferred from the fact of giving birth to one or more illegitimate children.
This leads one to wonder whether it is sexual immorality or the birth of potential
public charges that is the object of attack. "Both" is possibly the answer. In any
case the question that presents itself is the intrinsic soundness, in an income main-
tenance program, of legislative restrictions that relate to a mother's personal moral
code or the legal status of the child.
We know that efforts to control sexual standards through the criminal law are
pervasive and widely accepted. A variety of sexual acts engaged in by consenting
adults are criminal,"0 notwithstanding growing disapproval of laws proscribing con-
duct "that has no substantial significance except as to the morality of the actor."
5 1
With notable exceptions, the criminal laws of the states include the offenses of
fornication and adultery, to choose the ones most relevant to the issues arising in
AFDC. But is the fact that fornication, for example, remains a crime necessarily
a measure of the reasonableness of a test of personal morality in governmental pro-
grams of income support? Is it justification to "pry into the bedroom [and] cross
47 261 App. Div. 373, 25 N.Y.S.2d 617 (194).
"
8 d. at 375, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
4 BELL, op. cit. supra note i2, at 179; cl. SWE T, op. cit. supra note 24, at 41-48.
"
0 See MoRRs PLoscowE, SEx AND Tim LAW (rev. ed. 1962). But see id. at 147; MODEL PENIAL CODE
§ 207.1, comment at 205 (Tent. Draft. No. 4, 1955); Weyrauch, Informal and Formal Marriage-An
Appraisal of Trends in Family Organization, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 88, 107 (296o), noting nonenforcement
of criminal statutes on illicit sex relations.
" MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.1, comment at 207 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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examine the woman as to her relations with the male lodger . . . We do not
look behind the existence of financial need in other programs. A finding of permanent
and total disability qualifies a person for assistance whether the disability proceeds
from a congenital defect or injury suffered in a drunken brawl, and continued receipt
of support can be anticipated so long as conditions related to the disability are met.
Yet immoral conduct, especially that which results in additional dependent children,
can jeopardize continuance of AFDC.5 3
It can be argued that legislative choice controls this outcome, that the support
of disabled persons could have been limited to those whose disabilities accrued in a
particular way. The example given may sharpen the issue. The reasonableness of
measures of exclusion and inclusion turns on the purpose of legislation as to the relief
to be afforded-income in this instance-and as to the universe to be served. Thus
the issue, restated, becomes whether, having identified a population at risk, a legis-
lature must include all persons within it as eligible for relief. If it need not, then
worthy mothers may be included, unworthy excluded, and the legal questions resolve
themselves into those directed at the fair bounds of administrative discretion in imple-
menting statutes. These questions, in the example posed, would concern legislative
intent as to the type of personal conduct rendering one ineligible and the legality of
investigation procedures and of denial or suspension of benefits. At this level, as
already noted, invasions of privacy may occur which are susceptible of judicial, as
well as legislative or administrative, correction.
If, on the other hand, statutory measures must be all-inclusive of the population
whose needs are their raison d'Stre then we may argue that a program established
to provide support to children dependent as a result of absent, incapacitated, or other-
wise insufficient parents may not exclude therefrom families with parents who disport
themselves personally in ways disapproved of. Such a conclusion would drastically
alter the present federal-state welfare system. Thus far in the categorical public
assistance programs, the states are free to elect which subpopulations potentially
eligible for federal matching shall be included. Some restrictions exist. The choice
of subpopulation must not be wholly unrelated to the purpose of the program, as
" DE Scs waiNiTz, op. cit. supra note 2, at 194, quoting the Minority of the Royal Commission
on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress of 19o9. Ironically, the comment was made in criticism of poor
relief in a report favoring the very programs that give rise to this type of criticism today-public
assistance.
"'The length to which welfare administrations go in scrutinizing personal conduct is well illustrated
in the following excerpt from the Louisiana Department of Public Welfare Manual:
"It is recognized that the client has a right to participate in social activities, including dating. The
fact that a mother has dates with a man does not in itself establish that a nonlegal marital union exists
[in which case deprivation of parental support must be established in respect to this nonlegal 'spouse'] ....
"If the mother is not known to have given birth to a child out of wedlock and does not have a past
history of nonlegal marital unions, if both she and the man in question are legally free to marry, and if
they are together during conventional, or acceptable hours of dating, the department would not presume
that a nonlegal marital union exists.
"On the other hand, if either is not free to marry or if the client and the man stay away from home
overnight, or he stays in the home to very late hours or overnight, or is in or out of the home at his will
at all hours, this is not dating and a nonlegal marital union shall be presumed to exist." (5 2-742.J).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
automatic exclusion of illegitimate children from a program to aid needy children
was said to be."
The states, of course, need not participate at all in the grant-in-aid programs.
Realistically, they seem bound to do so. Public support for certain kinds of income
maintenance and the availability of federal funds for the categorical aids presage con-
tinuation of the nearly universal state participation in all programs.r5 State maneuver-
ing room is limited in view of conditions imposed on receipt of federal funds. Choice
of subpopulation is one of the few determinations that is significantly controlled by
local law and policy. It is one remaining element among the shrinking number of
state strategies for setting the direction of public policy and controlling local costs in
public assistance. Its existence underscores the fact that the welfare "system," however
much it has proliferated, is not a system but a series of measures with some over-
lapping and some yawning gaps. Its coverage and adequacy vary from state to state.
And neither federal nor state government is yet compelled to offer relief to all in need.
The omission of subpopulations from coverage in a particular state is doubtless re-
grettable; under the present system, however, it is surely permissible.
There is ample room for legislative activity. The pressures on individual recip-
ients would be greatly eased, in all likelihood, by removal of residence requirements
(as in the medical programs). Groups vulnerable to public disapproval could be
somewhat protected by requiring a certain minimum of coverage; no AFDC matching
at all, for instance, if AFDC-UP (AFDC for unemployed parents) is not also included.
At a lower level, the disapproval of practices that expose and restrict recipient con-
duct can be translated into pressure for modifying administrative procedures or testing
in the courts particular policies that appear to violate established rules of law. Thus,
investigation of sexual conduct by means of midnight raids can be brought to court
test.5 Means-test procedures can be replaced by simplified budgeting methods, and
the federal agency Would seem to be free to insist on uniform adoption of the latter
it sure of their superiority. Aberrant policies, unrelated to program goals set by
Congress, can be challenged under the conformity requirements.
Yet each of these approaches has its risks and weaknesses. Test cases require will-
ing candidates, and in the nature of the assistance caseload they are hard to find.
" See BELL, op. cit. supra note z2, at 71-72 (Social Security Commissioner questioned conformity of
Georgia plan under state act denying aid to families where mother had more than one illegitimate child;
act repealed a year after passage without having become effective); statement of Secretary Celebrezze,
March 26, z963, disapproving a Michigan bill which defined unemployment of parent, for purposes of
AFDC-UP, to exclude parents ineligible for unemployment compensation on the grounds that the
classification of unemployed parents was arbitrary and unreasonable; [1963-i964] Mwu. A'-r'y GEN.
BIENNIAL REP. 79 (No. 4156).
" All states participate in OAA, AFDC, AB, APTD; a lesser number have combined the adult cate-
gories (Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, § 141, 76 Stat. 197, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 138x-85
(Supp. 1965); AB, APTD, and OAA); 18 states have AFDC-UP to cover the unemployed parent; and
47 jurisdictions offer Medical Assistance to the Aged. See Program and Operating Statistics, Welfare in
Review, Feb. 1966, pp. 24-29.
I Control of investigatory practices can also be exercised by the federal agency through the "state-plan"
requirements. See note 34 supra.
PRIVACY IN WELFAIE 391
Uniformity of administrative practice is by no means an unmixed blessing; in a
high-grant state the routine application of simplified budgeting methods may produce
lower total grants in numerous cases. The result may seem justifiable to us; its virtues
must, however, be consciously balanced against its limitations.51 As to nonconform-
ity rulings the political hazards are high. Nonconformity pulls back federal
funds; it risks individual security and produces public outrage.58 Occasional recourse
to all these approaches is conceivably important for the dramatic educative value as
well as for the merits of the case at stake.
In summary, then, governmental intervention into the lives of public assistance
recipients is inevitable so long as dispensation of income maintenance proceeds on a
determination of individual need. The inherently offensive aspect of need deter-
mination and redetermination lies not in investigating need per se but in the
application of investigatory techniques and eligibility standards that are alien to
the conduct of other governmental affairs and that reach, in our opinion, far beyond
the point that honesty and efficiency in program administration reasonably require.
The basic issues revolve around the attitudes we take toward less fortunate persons,
the degree of double-checking assumed to be necessary to assure that legislative
objectives are carried out, and the adequacy of payments to be provided. These
issues have long been recognized. Tension between insistence on detailed punitive
eligibility procedures and emphasis on elevation of public support programs to the
position of "rights" is inevitable. In the ebb and flow of economic and political tides,
the relative balance shifts back and forth.
But in our own century hopeful steps in the direction of a comprehensive and
estimably-administered scheme of income maintenance have already been taken.
Recognition that current programs degrade individual recipients by exposing them
to a kind of scrutiny and control from which the rest of us are ordinarily exempt may
"
TThus, Burns, arguing in favor of an income-conditioned pension type of assistance, states:
"A policy which provides that an individual, if he has no resources, can count upon a stated money sum
(based, one would hope, on careful study of average family needs and expenditures patterns) would
more truly reflect the concept of 'the right to relief.' It would give the recipient more leeway, and, provided
he could make do on his allowance, his privacy would be respected." Burn§, What's Wrong With Public
Welfare?, 36 Soc. SEnv. Rxv. siz, u15 (1962). But if, in reality, the attainment of relatively high-grant
levels were contingent on detailed investigatory procedures, would the recipient appreciate the respect
that the rest of us show his privacy? ' Is sacrifice of income increment warranted in order to enlarge his
area of personal choice? That the issue is troublesome seems to be established by the fact that high-grant
states are more reluctant to adopt simplified budgeting methods than the low-grant states. It is possible
that simplified budgeting, and elimination of individualized investigation, promote values sufficiently im-
portant to the character of a democratic society that the recipients view of the issue is not determinative.
It should be recognized, nonetheless, that he may not share the high regard for protection of his privacy
that others in society express.
Only fifteen hearings to resolve conformity disputes have been called since the public assistance titles
were enacted in 1935. Carra R o- SOCIAL ,VELFARE POLICY AND LAw, op. cit. stepra note 14, at 59-20.
Unlike the sanction of "federalizing" state relief administration provided under the Federal Emergency
Relief Act of 1933, § 3 (b), 48 Stat. 56, the sanction flowing from a nonconformity ruling is withholding of
federal funds. Its severity has undoubtedly inhibited its use. BELL, op. cit. supra note 12, at x89-9o. The
1965 amendment adding provision for administrative and judicial review of conformity issues, Social
Security Amendments of 1965, 79 Stat. 419, 42 U.S.C.A. § 13x6 (Supp. x965), may lead to expanded
use of conformity hearings as a technique of federal supervision over the assistance grants-in-aid.
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hasten further adoption of statutes, administrative procedures, and professional
practices that are consonant with individual freedom and dignity.
C. Expanded Treatment Services
Government regulation of personal behavior-telling people how they should
live-has been discussed thus far in coercive, punitive terms. Recipients are exposed
in their quest for aid. Welfare officials become fraud investigators to make sure that
only the economically and morally deserving receive assistance. The lever used by
officials is simple and direct: assistance will be denied unless the recipient submits
to investigation or, sometimes, to control over personal behavior-over moral conduct
as well as over how the money is to be spent.
In recent years, welfare programs have begun to change; they are expanding from
assistance programs to treatment programs. The 1962 amendments to the Social
Security Act, 9 and earlier ones in 1956,60 announce the new philosophy of en-
couraging the states to institute or expand a variety of service programs: counseling,
training, vocational rehabilitation, home management, and so on. The various pro-
grams of the Economic Opportunity Act take a somewhat similar approach. 1 The
poor, under the service approach, have many "needs," only one of which is financial.
Public efficiency (the desire to cut welfare costs) may partially explain the new di-
rection; services associated with continuing eligibility requirements can be accounted
for on this ground. Services for money management may be "services," but ultimately
they are evaluated in terms of impact on public expenditures. Their rationale is to
assure the public that income disbursed to promote the well-being of clients and
families in fact reaches them in the form of food, clothing, or some other socially-
approved commodities.
But the service approach also reflects humanitarian impulses; it rests on a con-
viction that more must be done for the underprivileged than can be effectively
accomplished through financial aid. Despite the benign motives underlying services
designed to rehabilitate, and despite the fact that on the surface services are voluntary
for many recipients, administrative practices raise important issues.
One issue flows directly from federal policy. Services within the states are en-
couraged by a matching formula of funds, seventy-five per cent federal to twenty-
five per cent state. 2 To receive the federal share, states are bound to provide specified
types of service and are encouraged by availability of federal funds to add even more.
The federal policies establish differential treatment of the categories:' AFDC is one
where service is mandatory." Recipients in this category are not only universally
:g 76 Stat. z85 (1962), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6oi-o5 (x964).
a 70 Stat. 848 (956), 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-03 (x964). See generally tenBroek, The 1956 Amendments
to the Sodal Security Act: After the New Look-the First Thought, 6 J. PuB. L. 123 (x957).
:2 78 Star. 512 (x964), 42 U.S.C. S 2731 (1964).
"76 Stat. 73, I75 (1962), 42 U.S.C. §§ 303(a)(4), 6o3(a)(3) (1964).
"See State Letter No. 6o6 transmitting revision of HAND oOK Pt. IV, §§ 40oo e seq.
lThe conclusion rests on the plan requirement added to AFDC in x962: "A State plan . . . must
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presumed to have need of service; they are, unlike all other recipients, required to
take it."5
This compulsory factor, unique to one category, simply highlights a basic problem
common to all: the recipient is vulnerable to the caseworker. The caseworker is still
administering one program; but now it contains both assistance and service features.
The official, then, is in position not only to impose assistance-type conditions (e.g.,
severing relations with a man) but also his own notions of what services a recipient
ought to take advantage of to improve family functioning. Recipients become vul-
nerable not only to the punitive, moralistic official but also to the overzealous, well-
intentioned but mistaken official, the social therapist who is certain that he knows
what the client "needs." The services are voluntary for some and required for others.
In every case, however, there are many ways by which the caseworker can persuade
the recipient to follow his professional advice.
The power of the service-minded caseworker to impose his will arises principally
from the fact that assistance determinations are not "either-or" propositions. The
recipient, in addition to receiving basic sums to cover minimal recurring needs (rents,
utilities, food, and so forth), will request from time to time money for a wide variety
of special needs: extra clothing, club fees, tools for a child in work training, help in
getting higher education for a child. These are important matters for the welfare
recipient. They are authorized by statute but decided by the caseworker. They are
discretionary decisions, and they arise repeatedly, particularly in the more progressive
states, which exert themselves to offer the "extras." Unlike eligibility conditions, them-
selves matters for discretionary interpretation, the standards for service are so vaguely
stated as to be undefined68 Moreover, public expectations of the gains to come from
services focus on rehabilitation, by which is meant the end of dependency. The ex-
pectations, nourished by the service amendments, rest on frail reeds; neither our
limited knowledge of the pathways to rehabilitation nor the untrained, unstable work
... (13) provide for the development and application of a program for such welfare and related services for
each child who receives aid to families with dependent children as may be necessary in the light of the
particular home conditions and other needs of such child .... " 76 Stat. 185 (1962), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6o2(a)(13) (1964). States are free to determine whether they will extend services to all families or only
those whose children have special needs, but since investigation and planning for every family must
precede selection of families to be served, the option for service resides with the states, not recipients.
Screening is mandatory on all, and services on those selected therefor. For a state electing to extend service
to all AFDC recipients, see ILL. DEP'T PoBLIc AID, RELEASE No. 63:8, MANUAL (1963).
a5 Ibid. Ten years ago tenBroek noted dangers associated with the service program which have to
some extent been realized in subsequent experience. See tenBroek, The 1956 Amendments to the Social
Security Act: After the New Look-the First Thought, 6 J. Pua L. 123, 145 (957). See also Schorr,
The Trend to Rx, Social Work, Jan. 1962, pp. 59, 64-66.
"
6 See, e.g., the statement of purpose in AFDC:
"For the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes
of relatives by enabling each State to furnish financial assistance and rehabilitation and other services, as
far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to needy dependent children and the parents or
relatives with whom they are living to help maintain and strengthen family life and to help such parents
or relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support and personal independence con-
sistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care and protection . ... " 70 Stat. 848 (1956), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 6oi (1964).
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force that carries out the public's will promises much hope that services alone will
produce desired results.
And were there assurance of achieving the desired ends, the levers of compulsion
or imbalance of power possessed by caseworker over recipient would still raise the
question of how voluntary is the recipient's engagement in the "helping" process.
For the recipient is likely to feel (and he or she may be right) that more of what is
important will be forthcoming if there is a show of cooperation with the caseworker's
suggestions for self-improvement.
The new welfare programs expand the areas of official concern into additional
aspects of private life and personality. If the character of a recipient is to be changed
in order to better equip him for life, then techniques must be used to explore social
and psychological defects. The programs legitimize governmental concern in those
matters that affect the process of rehabilitation. The price of rehabilitation is the
increased vulnerability of welfare recipients to the humanitarian regulator of personal
life.
III
PRIVACY ISSUES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUsTICE
A moment's reflection will reveal the striking similarities between the adminstra-
tion of welfare services and the administration of juvenile justice. The target popula-
tions are more or less the same. Delinquency is rising in the suburbs, but the major
source of supply for the juvenile justice system comes from lower socioeconomic
classes. Both the welfare and juvenile-justice systems are characterized by officials
exercising enormously wide discretionary authority. In both systems the clients
are extremely vulnerable to all sorts of state control. In both systems the officials
can employ coercive powers-in juvenile justice, custodial institutions; in welfare, the
denial of assistance. In both systems governmental intrusions and control over
personal life are justified on the same ideological basis: the programs are to help the
clients, not to punish them. In the newer welfare programs, treatment goals legitimize
increased governmental control; this is a well-established phenomenon in juvenile
justice. Welfare statutes are only a starting point for the examination of the reach
of government into the lives of disadvantaged people. Similar issues are raised in the
administration of juvenile justice.
A. Delinquency
Official interventions in the lives of adolescents and their families are based
initially on broadly defined statutes. Definitions of delinquent vary from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction. Generally, the term has been defined to cover youthful perpetrators
" See DEPARTMENTAL TASm FORCE ON SOCIAL WoRK, EDUCATION AND MANPOWER, U.S. DEP'T oF
HEA.TH, EDUCATION, AND WELARt, REPORT, CLONoo THE GAP IN SOCIAL WORK MANPOWER (x965). Com-
pare ALLEN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 12-x6.
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of (a) acts that would be criminal if committed by adults; (b) acts that violate civil
prohibitions (i.e., violations of "any county, town, or municipal ordinance"); or (c)
violation of vaguely defined catchalls that seem to express the notion that the adoles-
cent, if allowed to continue, will engage in more serious conduct. In this latter category,
one finds statutes proscribing associations with "vicious or immoral" persons, running
away from home "without just cause," and using vile, obscene, or vulgar language,
as well as conduct leading to the conclusion that the youth is "incorrigible," "dis-
orderly," "given to sexual irregularities," "beyond the control of parent or guardian" or
that he "so deports himself as willfully to injure or endanger the morals or health of
himself or others.""8
In many jurisdictions, the statutory definitions have not been narrowed by judicial
construction; adolescents are held as "delinquent" for only minor misconduct: care-
lessness, truancy, mischief, running away from home, ungovernability, petty sex
offenses, or because of environmental circumstances.69 If an adolescent is adjudged
"delinquent," he can be put on probation and subjected to various degrees of super-
vision, removed from his home, or institutionalized. Some courts have used bizarre
or cruel sanctions: "short shock periods of confinement, .... thirty-day confinements at
work camp for children who defy court's order to refrain from driving,". "essays and
home improvement projects," deliberate publicity about the adolescent's crime and
public identification of him and his family, and, finally, "washing police cars." °
Historically, the court was the center of juvenile justice reform activity; even today
it still receives most of the scholarly and reform attention. However, quantitatively if
not qualitatively, the police and court intake probation staff seem to play far more
significant roles in the control of delinquency. Almost all (over ninety-eight per cent)
of the delinquency cases are referred by the police. The FBI estimates that about
half of the cases are handled within the police department; estimates of the Chicago
Police Department, Youth Division, run as high as seventy per cent. Of the cases
referred to court (for one reason or another deemed incapable of handling by the
police), about half are handled by the court intake probation staff. In other words,
about eighty per cent of the adolescents taken into custody for delinquency probably
never get to court.71 Figures on the pre-court aspects of the system are hard to come
by, especially since it is impossible to estimate how many police contacts are never
recorded. But it is clear that the overwhelming majority of delinquents taken into
custody never see a juvenile court judge.
If adults are taken into custody but not brought before the courts, the case is
' FpaREcK B. SUSM ANN, THE LAW OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 21 (1959); Paulsen, Tie Delinquency,
Neglect, and Dependency Jurisdiction of the juvenile Court, in Jusm c OR THE CHILD 49 (Rosenheim ed.
1962).
"Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965
Wis. L. REv. 7, x5.
'o Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HAv. L. REv.
775, 807 (1966).
" Compare id. at 776.
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dismissed; the arrestee is returned to society relatively free from official regulation
(although there may be continued surveillance or harassment). This does not neces-
sarily happen when an adolescent is taken into custody for a delinquent act but is
"screened out" before getting to court. The police and intake staff have developed
elaborate systems of regulating the conduct of adolescents and families. The leverage
that the police and the intake staff have is the threat of court referral: if the adolescent
and his family do not cooperate, the case will be referred to court. The adolescent
will have a permanent court record that may hurt him in later life; he will be stig-
matized; he may be removed from the home; and he may be institutionalized.
It is known that the police also regulate adults unofficially by the threat of formal
proceedings: arrest, police records, prosecution. But there are significant differences
in the ranges of power that the police have with adolescents as compared with adults.
The statutory definitions of delinquency are considerably broader than definitions of
criminal behavior; the role of the police in administering the juvenile system is
correspondingly broader. In addition, it is easier for the police or the intake staff to
apply the lever of court referral, since broad statutory definitions can be made to fit
most cases. With adults, procedural requirements attempt to restrict the basis on
which police can arrest, search, or question persons suspected of crime. To a large
extent, these restrictions do not apply to the relationships between the police and
juveniles. In juvenile justice, the police have broader discretion to investigate ado-
lescents and/or take them into custody; without a warrant, an officer can take into
custody and detain a child if the parents are unavailable or the officer considers the
parents incapable of coping with a minor form of deviance.
What are the criteria that the police use in regulating delinquents?1" The Manual
of Procedure of the Youth Division of the Chicago Police Department sets forth
an instructional guide for its officers on how to handle juvenile cases.P There are
three basic dispositions that an officer is authorized to make:
i. Community Adjustment. Releasing the juvenile to his parents or guardian with-
out the need for further police action. In some instances there may be need for a
follow-up by the youth officer to determine the juvenile's progress.
2. Community Adjustment and Resource Referral. Releasing the juvenile to his
parent or guardian, in addition referring the child and his parent or guardian to a
resource agency or organization in the community, in the light of the needs of
either the juvenile or the family or both.
3. Juvenile Court Filing. Immediate detention of the juvenile at the Audy Home,
or temporary release of the juvenile to his parent or guardian, to be followed by
conference at the Complaint Division of the Juvenile Court.7 4
'" Most of our information about the Chicago Police Department's handling of juveniles is attributable
to Herman Goldstein, Assistant Professor of Law, Wisconsin Law School.
" Yotrru D sIoN, CmcAco POLiCE DE PA mENT, MANuAL or PROCEDURE (Nov. 1965) [hereinafter
cited as MANuA.].
S"MANUAL 1111..4.
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The officers are given six guidelines in exercising their judgment as to which
disposition to choose. The guidelines are stated separately but are interdependent:
I. "Type and seriousness of the offense." The Manual calls for court filing if a
serious offense ("usually classified as a felony") is committed by "an older juvenile."
Different treatment may be used if the same offense is committed by "a child of
tender years" unless there is a "strong need for help which could only be obtained
through court filing." Discretion is even broader with minor offenses ("the type of
behavior frequendy referred to as Disorderly Conduct"). "Some consideration
should be given to a Community Adjustment ... where no serious negative considera-
tions arise in respect to the remaining guidelines." Interventions may be based on
minor misconduct or a disturbed environment. "Sometimes this type of situation
[a series of minor offenses] might be more in need of attention than one where an
isolated and more serious offense has been committed.... ." "Even a minor offense,
which might not in and of itself warrant a court filing, could require such filing for
purposes of removing the child from his home for reasons of neglect or dependency."
2. "The previous behavioral history of the juvenile." The officer is instructed
to consider the record of the child-both the Youth Division record and the officer's
personal knowledge, if any. If there is a "previous history indicating that the juvenile
has been involved in a series of other minor offenses all of which were adjusted
without court filing... consideration should then be given to the possibility of court
intervention no matter how minor the offense charged.... [But] even here a care-
ful exploration of all possible avenues of help would be advisable before a court filing."
3. Environmental factors, including the disposition and capacity of the juvenile.
A Community Adjustment, says the Manual, contemplates a change in "elements
having a deleterious effect upon the juvenile" and the "capacity of the juvenile to
change his behavior and to accept help." Accordingly, the officer must investigate the
"neighborhood and the negative forces at work there," "family relationships," "school
problems," and the "juvenile's own makeup and temperament."
4. The attitudes of the parents and "their ability to provide the necessary super-
vision and guidance." The Manual reminds the officers that in many situations the
attitudes and abilities of the parents are important "whatever disposition is eventually
made," particularly "as insuring that.., plans. .. for referral to a community agency
will be carried forward by them." "The youth officer is interested not only in the
parents' attitude toward the child, but the view they take of the offense committed."
"A home interview enables the youth officer to observe the child in his family
setting, and therefore helps him to make a more selective and meaningful disposition."
5. The attitude of the complainant. The complainant has the right to insist on
a court filing if an offense has been committed and "there are reasonable grounds to
believe the juvenile in question is implicated." But, "most persons will agree with
an intelligent plan of rehabilitation.., when careful and painstaking explanation is
made regarding the proposed plan for a Community Adjustment."
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6. Community resources. In some situations, the child's family is a sufficient re-
source. In other situations, the officer will refer the child and/or the family to com-
munity agencies when the family needs additional help with the child or when
"other members of the family ... are in need of assistance and counseling. ' 5
The above procedures relate to "delinquency"--where the adolescent may have
committed what would have been a crime if committed by an adult, or a violation
of a civil prohibition or is guilty of lower forms of misconduct. The lightest disposition
is the Community Adjustment. The adolescent is returned home, but there may
be continuing supervision by the youth officers of varying degrees of severity. Ac-
cording to the Manual, three factors enter into the officer's decisions as to whether
to impose Community Adjustment. One is objective-the offense has to be of a minor
nature. The other two are subjective-the adolescent has to appear to "have such
personal controls as would make the repetition of the offense unlikely," and his
parents must "give every indication of a wish to cooperate and to provide the neces-
sary supervision." ' The adolescent and the family may have the proper attitude, but
the officer may still think that they are unable to cope with the situation. If a com-
munity agency is available to give what the officer thinks are the necessary services,
the officer may refrain from court filing. Of course, if the adolescent and the family
decline to use the community services, the case will be referred to court. If the
offense is serious, or if there have been a series of minor offenses and previous failures
of Community Adjustment, or if the parents are incapable of providing the necessary
supervision, the case will be referred. The adolescent may be taken into immediate
custody if he (i) "has a history of running away and is likely not to appear at the
[court] conference"; (2) "has committed such a serious offense as would indicate that
he might be a danger to the community or to himself"; or (3) "cannot be controlled
by his parents or they exhibit a lack of cooperation."'7
The Manual tells the officer how he should exercise his authority. The extent to
which officers behave in accordance with the Manual is, of course, an empirical ques-
tion. There is evidence that in some jurisdictions officers rely on race and demeanor
in deciding whether to take an adolescent suspected of delinquency into custody and
the type of sanction to impose.78 The juvenile and the family have to show the
officer what he thinks is proper respect and have to view the situation with appropri-
ate seriousness. Community adjustment will be forfeited if the juvenile or the
family is cavalier or indifferent (ie., "cool") and, of course, if they are hostile.
Challenging the officer's authority, including asking for legal assistance, is not the
proper attitude; the sanction will be court referral.
Community Adjustment (or its equivalent in other areas) is a continuing process;
'DId. at 111.1.1, 2.
ad. t 111.1.4.
77 1d. at 111.1.5.
78 Sec Note, supra note 7o, at 782.
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its substantive character also varies with the jurisdiction. The Kansas City police ad-
minister a program called "grounding":
A typical "grounded" youth must attend school unless a doctor's explanation is
obtained for his absence. At all other times he may leave the house only if accom-
panied by a parent, and then not for any activity that is primarily engaged in for
pleasure. He must dress conventionally and have his hair cut in a reasonable man-
ner; and he must study at home for a minimum prescribed period each day. After
this schedule is enforced for a month, lesser conditions will be imposed for duration
of the school yearY9
Officers may require standards of conduct that in their judgment are indicative of good
behavior: obedience to parents and school authorities, regular school attendance, par-
ticipation in approved social activities, or regular church attendance.
In Chicago, Community Adjustment decisions are usually handled at the pre-
cinct station. The youth officers have separate offices for conferences with the ado-
lescents and the families. Depending on the regulation imposed, follow-ups may be
conducted in the street, the home, with school authorities, or with social agencies in
the community. Other jurisdictions have more elaborate procedures. In some
jurisdictions, the police conduct hearings of a somewhat formal nature. Notice of
the time and place of the hearing is sent or delivered (by a patrolman) to the
family. The adolescent and the parents appear before a "hearing officer" or "coun-
selor" (who is a uniformed officer) at the station. The hearing officer sits behind a
desk and quasi-judicial formalities are used, but the adolescent and family are not
advised of the right to have counsel or the right to remain silent. It is extremely rare
for counsel to appear. The purpose of this procedure is to "solemnify the inevitable
lecture to the juvenile and to increase the chances that he will confess.'8s "A per.-
sistent denial of guilt is taken to indicate that the juvenile is not amenable to the
'noncompulsory' approaches of his parents, local agencies, or the police, and requires
referral to court."81 There is no authority for compelling attendance at these
hearings; again, the leverage is court referral and police records.
When a delinquent case is referred to court, the intake probation staff "screens" it
in much the same manner as the police. Informal probation is used as an alternative
to court referral. The intake staff, like the police, consider age, attitude, history,
family situation; what the adolescent did is not of great importance, unless the act
was a serious offense. In a few jurisdictions, informal probation is authorized legis-
latively and is subject to more or less judicial control ' In most jurisdictions, how-
ever, this is not the case. The leverage used by the probation staff is the same used by
the police--court referral-with one important addition: the probation staff files an
evaluation report on the adolescent which is usually very influential in any subsequent
"Id. at 784.
oId. at 780.
"Id. at 781.
"Id. at 789-g0.
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judicial disposition. Extended informal probation is buttressed by threats of "dire
consequences should ... [the adolescent] fail to behave." 3
B. Dependency and Neglect
Statutory definitions of dependent and neglected also vary from state to state.
In some states, no distinction is made-a child may be "dependent or neglected," with
a single definition. Generally, however, neglect seems to contain the notion of fault
on the part of the parents in failing to provide proper care for children, and depen-
dency refers to the inability of the parents to provide such care. In any event, the
statutory definitions of dependency and neglect are very broad and include such
phrases as "destitute, homeless or abandoned"; "a home which by reason of neglect,
cruelty or depravity on the part of the parents ... is an unfit place"; "has not proper
parental care or guardianship." 4 The Iowa statute concludes with "such other unfit
surroundings to bring such child, in the opinion of the court, within the spirit of this
chapter.' s
One extreme act of abuse may satisfy statutory standards, but usually an adjudica-
tion of dependency or neglect requires a protracted failure on the part of the parents0
Persistent physical cruelty, flagrant sexual immorality, or total abandonment should,
in most situations, be enough for the court. Short of extreme situations, neglect
depends on the court's assessment of the home environment. Parents are not held
to the highest moral standards, but it is difficult to predict what types of deviancy
will constitute lack of parental care. Conflicts over religious opposition to needed
medical attention for children represent some of the more dramatic dilemmas faced
by the courts. Sanctions in dependency and neglect cases vary with the type of mis-
conduct involved. Generally, parental rights are not terminated unless the conduct is
serious. Most often custody will be changed without terminating parental rights,
though the absence of the child may loosen meaningful parental ties. sT In less
extreme cases, the court might provide for counseling and other forms of supervision
in the home.ss
There is little information on the administration of dependency and neglect cases
at the police or intake levels. The Chicago Youth Division Manual defines neglect
in terms of "unsafe premises," "lack of sanitary facilities," "lack of heat," "danger of
fire," "vermin or rodent infestation," "malnourishment," inadequate clothing, "ex-
ploitation and overwork," "exposure to vice situations," lack of attendance for long
periods of time, "undue family friction and marital discord," mental illness of the
83Tappan, Unoffcial DelinquencY, 29 Nais. L. REv. 547, 554 (95o).
"'See Paulsen, supra note 68, at 63; Rosenhein, The Child and His Day in Court, Child Vclfarq
Jan. x966, p. 17, 2r.
'IoWA CODES 232.2(7) (x962).
s' Rosenheirn, The Child and His Day in Court, Child Welfare, Jan. x966, p. 17, 22.
Cf'. In re Bonez, 266 N.Y.S.zd 756 (Family Ct. x966).
, Paulsen, supra note 68, at 6.5-66.
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parents, and "lack of proper supervision." 9 If an officer decides that a child is neg-
lected, he may refer the child and the family to an agency if the "needs of the child
and the family ... [can] be met by the agency," "the family... [will] cooperate," and
an "agency .. . [is] available and willing to work with the family." The officer is
also authorized to remove the child from the home if he is "in immediate danger of
being physically, morally, or emotionally harmed." But "the youth officer must avoid
being stampeded into the removal of the child by reason of the apparent emergency " '
The Youth Division Manual does not list Community Adjustment as an appropri-
ate disposition for dependency and neglect cases; such cases are to be referred to court
or to a social agency, or the child is to be taken to a special custodial institution. Is
there nevertheless some sort of informal police regulation? The police certainly have
sufficient power. In investigating a juvenile case, the officer is not restricted to only
one statutory category. "The Youth Officer, when processing a young child for a
delinquent act, should be alert for evidence of abuse or gross neglect by the parents
... of such child."' Even if an act of delinquency does not warrant court filing, the
officer may still remove the child "for reasons of neglect or dependency." The multiple
and easily transferable bases of official intervention" increase the officer's leverage over
the child and the family.
Do the police, then, attempt to improve family functioning in neglect and depen-
dency situations which they do not regard as sufficiently serious to warrant formal
proceedings? We don't know. The Youth Division claims not. They say (and
it seems plausible) that the police do not regard neglect and dependency as "normal"
police functions.9" Delinquency is regarded as essentially crime detection and pre-
vention9 The police do handle many neglect and dependency cases, but the cases
are usually thrust upon them. Neighbors call and complain about battered or
abandoned children. Quite often the police simply find small children wandering
the streets late at night. The police say that they attempt to refer all cases to social
agencies, even if they are deemed sufficiently serious as to warrant immediate
removal from the home. The police are on duty twenty-four hours a day, and, of
course, they encounter neglect and dependency situations at times when referrals
are difficult. But in general, the Chicago police do not appear to have an elaborate
regulatory system for dependency and neglect. But what happens, then, with the
cases that are referred to the social agencies? Do they refer all cases to court? This
seems unlikely. Do they then engage in extensive regulation using the threat of
court referral as leverage? We have no reliable information on these questions.
S9 MAINUAL V.5.3.
00 ibid.
91ibid.
Chicago police officers have said that finding a dependent or neglected child is like getting a flat tire
on patrol: the officer is temporarily "out of commission."
'a The opening statements of the MANUAL read as follows: "As part of a law enforcement agency, we
have given primary consideration in the determination of our procedures to the goal of preventing and
suppressing delinquent and criminal conduct. This is the mission to which we are sworn." MANUAL iV.
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C. Privacy Issues
The administration of juvenile justice, then, results in extensive regulation of
personal and family behavior. The apparatus of the state is concerned not only with
aggressive criminal conduct but also with school problems, child rearing, and moral
behavior. Families and adolescents coming into contact with the system are required
to do things not required of others, or they must refrain from activities others are
allowed to enjoy. To a great extent, regulation is imposed without court sanction
or control. Regulation is extensive substantively, and it is not subject to what are
normally thought of as due process controls.
The regulatory reach of the state sprouts from all the levels in the juvenile justice
system. In the first instance, the regulatory power is derived from legislation.
The legislature defines the very broad terms delinquent, dependent, and neglected.
It defines the juvenile court jurisdiction and authorizes the court to adjudicate
and dispose of juvenile cases. Institutionalization, terminating parental relationships,
and other punitive sanctions and deprivations of liberty stem from legislative com-
mands. The legislative structure is also largely responsible for the administrative
practices of the police and the intake probation staff. Traditional police detection and
preventive activities are authorized by the statutes. The areas of police investigation
in the administration of juvenile justice are broader and more numerous than the
areas investigated in administering criminal statutes. But the expanded jurisdiction
in juvenile justice is not the result of the police arrogating to themselves tasks that
do not belong to them legitimately; the legislature has told them to investigate these
areas. Directions in the Chicago Youth Division Manual to investigate home con-
ditions, attitudes of adolescents and families, and school difficulties are interpretations
of statutory commands.
It is misleading to view Community Adjustment, informal probation, and the
roles of public and private social agencies as beyond the pale of legitimacy. It is true
that most informal adjustment is not specifically provided for legislatively, but these
extensive regulatory practices are known; they are acquiesced in by the legislatures
and the courts; and, at least as far as the police are concerned, some aspects of their
regulatory activity are appropriate features of the discretion of law enforcement
officials. Of course, some of the activities of the police and the intake staff are in-
warranted; in administrative law terms, they are beyond the scope of delegated
authority. But it is important to recognize that much of the structure of the admin-
istration of juvenile justice is the result of legislative command.
The substantive reach of the administration of juvenile justice is also the result
of conscious policy choice and colors the regulatory activities of officials throughout
the system. The ideological basis of juvenile justice is treatment.
The essential spirit of the juvenile court has never been better expressed than in a
statement made by the late Judge Edward F. Waite more than four decades ago.
According to Judge Waite, the crucial distinction between the traditional criminal
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court and the juvenile court is that between a court which directs its efforts "to do
something to a child because of what he has done," and a court concerned with
"doing something for a child because of what he is and needs." This distinction,
so felicitously expressed, points to very real and significant differences in orienta-
tion.9 4
The single criminal act-what the adolescent has done-is important primarily as a
symptom of broader personality or environmental needs. Thus, no distinctions should
be made between the delinquent and the dependent or neglected. The adolescent
(whether delinquent, dependent, or neglected) needs understanding, guidance, and
protection; juvenile justice is individual treatment.9 5
The treatment orientation supports the extensive substantive regulation in the
system. The theory behind judicially-imposed essays and home improvement projects
is obvious, if misguided. "Judge Gardner of Santa Ana specialized in short shock
periods of confinement, a punitive measure he thinks effective." Similar "thera-
peutic" practices are not uncommon,7 and the police and the intake staff are no
less inclined to indulge in them than are the courts. It is probably true that most of
these officials have a genuine interest in the adolescents and the families and think
that they are performing valuable rehabilitative services for them. The Youth
Division Manual is the product of highly motivated police officers, the School of
Social Work at Loyola University, and private agencies. The Manual tries to pro-
fessionalize and humanize police work with children. It tries to guide the police
in exercising their discretion, and it fully recognizes that adolescents in trouble are
different from criminal adults. At the very least, the police and the intake staff feel
that if adolescents charged with delinquency and their families will work with them,
the harsher results of the formal proceedings-police records, the stigma of being
labeled a "delinquent," and perhaps removal of the adolescent from the home and
institutionalization-can be avoided. The police and the intake staff regulate not
because they want to punish, but because they feel that they can best fulfill the treat-
ment goals of the program. They want to "give the kid a break."
Moreover, it should be recognized that the Chicago effort has been accomplished in
the face of great odds. The Manual and the Youth Division had to grow in a depart-
ment that was not committed to the philosophy of juvenile justice. Traditional police
officers draw little or no distinction between the youthful and adult offender. They
have a thinly veiled contempt for the juvenile justice system-youth officers in the
Chicago Department are referred to as "diaper dicks" by their fellow officers-and
they regard the procedures of the Manual as "coddling" and as merely perpetuating
criminal tendencies.
"ALLEN, op. ct. supra note 4, at 17-x8. (Footnotes omitted.)
" See Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965
Wis. L. REv. 7, 9-10.
" Note, supra note 7o, at 807.
'7 Lecture by Judge Arthur L. Dunne, Magistrate, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, at the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Law School, March 14, x966.
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The tailored-treatment philosophy of juvenile justice serves to broaden further
the administrative discretion of officials. Remote areas of family life and personal
conduct are proper subjects of official concern. Confessions and displays of appropri-
ate manifestations of seriousness, respect, and deference are not simply to make
police work easier; attitudinal changes are considered by the police, the intake staff,
and the judges to be preconditions of treatment. A youth cannot be "helped" unless
he has recognized his guilt and is willing to be rehabilitated; a person cannot be
treated if he thinks that he has been accused unjusdy. Statutory language, ideology,
perhaps rationalization, all serve to legitimize the penetration of government into
the mind itself. It seems curious, in a way, that the "new" social welfare programs are
now catching up with the youth officer on the beat; the rhetoric of the juvenile court
reform movement, at the turn of the century, was not too dissimilar from the rhetoric
of the War on PovertyY8
The pervasiveness of the juvenile justice system of regulation is staggering, but it
is obvious that the system could go further, if we are willing to pay the price. Ex-
panded search and interrogation techniques by law enforcement agencies would
probably result in the apprehension of more criminals and the prevention of more
crime. Expanded regulation need not, however, assume overt punitive and surveillance
characteristics; it too can be rehabilitative or treatment-oriented. It has been sug-
gested, for example, that "crime-prone" areas of cities (i.e., poverty-stricken areas) be
subject to massive welfare services, including educational programs for parents, to
reduce crime and delinquency. Incentives could be used to stimulate voluntary
cooperation. School officials could identify students "in difficulty" who then would
be subject to special programs to prevent incipient delinquency."" Programs of this
nature blur the line between law enforcement and publicly-administered welfare; but
this presents no conceptual problem for juvenile justice since, as we have seen, the
ideology of that system is treatment-oriented to begin with. The line between co-
ercion and freedom of choice is also blurred, but the distinction, as we have im-
plied, is already hazy. A potential school drop-out, or a state-selected family for
special counseling services, does not have to accept the offer of official "help," but the
consequences of refusal can be made dear1 ° An adolescent does not have to accept
Community Adjustment, either, if he prefers a police record, court referral, and
possible institutionalization. Programs to prevent delinquency, dependency, and
neglect can be expanded, but, however labeled, they will be expansions of official
regulation of private lives.
Proposals to restrict the scope of juvenile justice also involve a balancing of costs
9 The rhetoric that was spoken at the turn of the century is presented in Rosenheim, juvenile Court-
Reality or Ideal, juvenile Ct. judges J., Winter x965, p. 25.
99 See PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF CRIME AND DELINQiJENCY, FINAL REPORT (report prepared for the
California Youth and Adult Corrections Agency, 1965).
100 For problems in drawing the line between voluntarism and coercion in official-client relations, see
Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welare Adminisiration, 54 CALIF. L. Rxv. 479 (1966).
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against gains. The more radical proposals would allow state interference, in the case
of delinquency, only if the adolescent has committed an act that would be a crime
if committed by an adult. The state would have to prove its case against the
adolescent according to procedures far more rigorous than the informal procedures
of most present-day juvenile court proceedings. Judicially imposed dispositions would
be based on what the adolescent did, not on what the court or the probation staff
thinks he "needs." In dependency and neglect cases, the state would be allowed
to take a child from the home only in the most severe cases--extreme brutality, for
example-and not because officials disapprove of the moral behavior or child-rearing
practices of parents.''
A number of justifications are advanced for cutting back the scope of juvenile
justice. Some are based on ideology, a preference for maximum freedom of the
individual in family matters except where the threats to the security of the child or
society are very clear. Others stress the difficulties of administering the juvenile
justice system. Depending of course on the particular adolescent and family in-
volved, treatment-oriented individualized justice may result in coercion, manipulation,
cynicism, fear, or bewilderment. Matza claims that in the eyes of the adolescent, the
system represents rampant injustice.10 2 Efficient law enforcement prevention and
detection techniques appear as discriminatory regulation. Differential disposition
(both formal and informal) based on family and home situations or the adolescent's
"problems" and "needs," rather than what he did, appear grossly unfair. Standards
for enforcement and disposition appear nonexistent. The lack of perceived standards
and what appears to be injustice run riot-that is, the family's extreme uncertainty as
to how to cope with the system-serve, in turn, to increase the leverage that the
officials have over the adolescents and the families. Extremely broad legislative and
administrative authorizations are further broadened by the psychological reactions
produced by the system in the minds of the adolescents and the families.
The juvenile institutions are often no different from adult prisons, and sometimes
they are worse.10s If the state is, in effect, incarcerating adolescents as if they were
adult criminals, then the adolescents should be held to the same minimal standards
of conduct and afforded the same procedural protections as adults. In dependency
and neglect cases, the child is taken from the unsuitable home but is then subjected
to a series of inadequate, mismanaged, and ill-supervised foster homes. The press
of large city dockets converts the juvenile court hearings from an informal father-son
session to an assembly-line processing. Furthermore, it is claimed that in fact most
judicial decisions are based on what the adolescent did and not on what he needs.
The rhetoric is hypocritical at the least; more often it is destructive of sound correc-
"I1 See, e.g., ALLEN, Op. cit. supra note 4, at 18-24; Paulsen, supra note 68; Tappan, Juridical and
Administrative Approaches to Children with Problems, in JusTICE FOR THE CHILD 144, 166-68 (Rosenheim
ed. 1962).1 02 DAVm MA=', DELINQUENCY AND DRIFr ch. 4 (1964).
... See ALBERT DauTscH, OUR REJECTED CHILDREN (950); PAUL W. TAP'AN, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
430-31 (1949).
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tional goals."0 4 Most significant, however, is the growing feeling that our present
state of knowledge is incapable of giving even the wisest of men a sufficient basis for
knowing what is "best" for adolescents and families. The problem is compounded
when the decisions are made by inadequately trained police officers, probation staff,
social workers, and juvenile court judges.'
The call to re-introduce criminal law procedures reflects a concern for the in-
tegrity of the individual. 06 The adult offender is tried for a specific act. In most
instances, his history and personality are not on trial. He has counsel to insist that
evidence be relevant to the issue. Prohibitions concerning search and seizure and
confessions give the individual additional protections from official interventions. In
theory, at least, the adult offender is not exposed to investigations of psychological
needs and official notions of therapy until after conviction. The situation is different
in juvenile justice. The vague statutes and the treatment philosophy authorize
officials to roam at will in the minds and lives of juveniles and families.
The latest juvenile justice reform statutes attempt to reflect this concern for the
integrity of the individual. The Illinois Juvenile Court Act of i965107 (which follows
closely the California and New York statutes)... introduces many procedural changes.
Standards are tightened for the temporary custody of children, the timing of court
hearings, dispositions, and the use of records by outside agencies. The most sig-
nificant procedural changes concern the court hearings. The hearing is bifurcated
into "adjudicatory" and "dispositional" hearings. The former is to determine
whether the adolescent is within the jurisdiction of the court (e.g., whether he com-
mitted an act of delinquency); the latter is to determine what treatment should be
undertaken if the adolescent is found to be "a ward of the court." Civil rules of evi-
dence apply in the adjudicatory hearing. The allegations must be supported by a
preponderance of the evidence. Findings cannot be based "solely upon the uncor-
roborated extra-judicial admission or extra-judicial confession of a minor."'00 There
is a right to counsel (including court-appointed counsel, if necessary), to be heard, to
present material evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, and to examine "pertinent court
files and records."' "0 The scope of the dispositional hearing is broader. In the words
of the statute,
After adjudging the minor a ward of the court, the court shall hear evidence on the
question of the proper disposition best serving the interests of the minor and the
public. All evidence helpful in determining this question, including oral and written
104 See MATzA, op. cit. supra note 102, at 133-34.
... The United States Supreme Court has recently expressed misgivings about the current procedures in
the juvenile courts. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1966).
1o See Rosenheim, The Child and His Day in Court, Child Welfare, Jan. 1966, p. 17.
"
7 ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-08 (1965).
' CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CoDE §§ 500-827; N.Y. Family Court Act, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 686,
art. 7.
log IL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 704-6 (1965).
1 0ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-2o(I) (1965).
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reports, may be admitted and may be relied upon to the extent of its probative value,
even though not competent for the purposes of the adjudicatory hearing l
On the other hand, the substantive reach of state power under the Illinois Act has
not been diminished. "Delinquency" has been narrowed to violations of law,112 but
a new category of deviance-covering minors "otherwise in need of supervision'--
sponges up those adolescents operating within minimal standards of conduct (i.e.,
the criminal law) but below the maximal standards imposed on adolescents. A
minor "otherwise in need of supervision" is one "who is beyond the control of his
parents ... [or] habitually truant from school.""' 3 The statute goes on: a "neglected
minor" is one "who is neglected as to proper or necessary support, education as
required by law, or as to medical or other remedial care recognized under State
law or other care necessary for his well-being, or who is abandoned ...or .. .
whose environment is injurious to his welfare or whose behavior is injurious to his
own welfare or that of others.""' 4 A "dependent minor" is one "who is without
a parent . . . or .. .who is without proper care because of the physical or mental
disability of his parent" and so forth." 5 All four categories of adolescents (or
their parents, as the case may be) are within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court.
They are subject to a wide variety of sanctions, such as probation, with varying
degrees of "protective supervision" (e.g., parents may be ordered "to refrain from
acts of omission that tend to make the home not a proper place for the minor"" 6),
or the adolescent can be taken from his parents and put in the custody of a "suitable
relative or other persons, .... an agency for care or placement," "some licensed training
school or industrial school."" 7  Guardianship (defined in the statute as "the duty
and authority, subject to residual parental rights and responsibilities, to make im-
portant decisions in matters having a permanent effect on the life and development
of the minor""' ) may be given to a probation officer." 9  However, only "delin-
quents" may be sent to the traditional juvenile custodial institutions.' °
In view of the still extensive substantive regulation, one wonders what the Illinois
Act has accomplished. The range of deviance has not been narrowed legislatively.
As long as the four categories of adolescents are potentially within the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court, the adolescents and their families are still subject to the regulatory
authority of the police and intake staff. The police are still charged with the duty of
investigating home conditions, family life, moral conduct, as well as crimes com-
mitted by juveniles. A small piece of the policeman's lever has been taken away:
unless the adolescent has violated a law, he cannot be committed to a custodial insti-
ll' ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-1() (1965).
221 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-2 (i965).
113 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-3 (1965).
114 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-4 (1965).
"'
5 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-5 (1965).
" ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-5(0) (1965).
... ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-7(I)(a), (c), (d) (I965).
118 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-1I (1965).
.. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-7()(b) (1965).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-7(l)(e)0, () (1965).
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tution. But the important fact is that so much else can be done to him and his
family. The extensive informal regulation will probably continue to function
pretty much as before; and, thus, the procedural reforms of the act may also lose a fair
part of their importance. The vast majority of cases will still never get to court;
many of the ones that do will not be contested.
The Illinois act has not broken with the basic dogmas of the juvenile justice
system. Thus, it states, "The purpose of this Act is to secure for each minor ...
such care and guidance ... as will serve the moral, emotional, mental, and physical
welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community . . . [and] to preserve
and strengthen the minor's family ties whenever possible .... ,,121 Delinquency, even
narrowly defined, is still merged in one unified administrative system with "minors
otherwise in need of supervision" and victims of dependency and neglect, and all are
subject to the coercive powers of law enforcement officials. Law enforcement power
is still not confined to crime: it is still being invoked for treatment services.
What are the alternatives to approaches like the Illinois Act? Should the surgery
be more radical? If distinctions are to be made between criminal conduct, on the
one hand, and inadequate family functioning, on the other, then maybe the admin-
istrative systems ought to be separated also. Perhaps it is a mistake to have a
unified juvenile court. Delinquency, with its attendant law enforcement regulation,
could be taken out of the civil court system and returned to the criminal courts.
This does not have to mean that adolescents would be subjected to the horrors
depicted by the early spirits behind the juvenile justice reform movement sixty-five
years ago. There still could be separate court rooms, detention facilities, probation
staff, custodial-treatment institutions, and other substantive and procedural modifica-
tions. The critical question, however, is this: what would be the impact of such a
separation on the lower-level administration? The Chicago police maintain that they
now only investigate charges of dependency and neglect and refer developed cases
to social agencies or the court without police regulation. We don't know the practices
in other police departments, but if they also regard dependency and neglect as out-
side normal police functions, then separating administrative systems should not sig-
nificantly affect police practices. The police would still be receiving a heavy volume
of dependency and neglect complaints, and they would discover others in the course
of their regular duties."2
The more troublesome dilemma 'concerns delinquency. Problems of pre-court
regulation-investigation, detection, Community Adjustment-must be faced as
long as we agree that adolescents who commit crimes should not go free. Even if
""ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-2 (1965).2 Illinois has recently enacted an Abused Child Law, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2041 (1965), which
provides service by the Department of Children and Family Services to receive and act upon complaints of
a "battered child." What effect this act will have on current police practices is not known. We would
guess that it will further encourage the police to make speedy referrals in neglect cases. The police, how-
ever, will still remain the principal initial receivers of complaints. The police are normally used for
after-hours emergencis-e.g., accidents, mental health, as well as abused children.
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definitions of delinquency were narrowed to reflect only minimal standards of con-
duct-to encompass only would-be felonies (if committed by adults) plus petty theft,
vandalism, sex offenses, assaults, and so forth--existing Community Adjustment
practices might not be affected significantly. Community Adjustment, again accord-
ing to the Chicago police, is currently not used for individuals "beyond the control of
parents" or guilty of truancy and other noncriminal conduct; these cases, too, are
referred to social agencies, school authorities, or simply not bothered with. In other
words, the extensive police regulation that appears to raise significant privacy issues
may already be reserved for those exhibiting criminal behavior, thus failing to meet
the minimal standards of conduct applicable to adults as well as adolescents.
If this is true, then we are faced with the question of whether we really want
the police to stop administering social services for adolescents in trouble. Do we want
the police to return to prior methods of law enforcement? It is important to recog-
nize that in the large urban centers, the problem is massive. In 1965, the Chicago
Youth Division handled 92,453 cases; of this total, 15,217 involved serious offenses
(murder, rape, serious assault, burglary, and so forth); 14,491 were of a less serious
nature (drinking, disorderly conduct, simple assaults, sex offenses, and crimes against
property); 9,948 defendants were simply incorrigible, runaways, or in similar diffi-
culty; 25,524 cases were curfew violations. u2 At the present time, the police are the
primary, if not the only agency, out in the field attempting to deal with violations by
adolescents. Who is to take their place? Can we have social workers manning the
city streets twenty-four hours a day?
It seems clear that in the immediate future at least some form of screening process
will continue to be used for adolescents in trouble and that in most communities the
principal screeners will continue to be the police. But police handling of juveniles
can be improved. Chicago's Youth Division Manual tries to suppress improper
criteria, such as race and demeanor, and more work has to be done in this area.
Standards for the administrative handling of adolescents can be tightened. More
rules for lower-level officials are badly needed. Police decisions should be made more
visible, and their criteria should be made more uniform. Officers need guidance.
At the present time, they are required to strike delicate balances, on the spot, between
privacy interests and law enforcement demands, and they lack sufficiently definite
rules and proper training. The police also need more support from other profes-
sional sources. Additional juvenile court judges can relieve the pressure for Com-
munity Adjustment and provide more court supervision of informal dispositions.
Additional social workers can be made available for consultation and help in super-
vision. Pre-court regulation can be improved to mitigate the harshness of formal
proceedings and at the same time protect the individual.
-YOUTH DivWsioN, CG o POLICE DEPARTMENT, DATA SHEET (1965).
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TREATMENT, PRIVACY, AND PUBLIC POLICY
When government enacts and administers programs dealing with people, it inter-
feres with personal behavior; indeed, this is usually the intention of the program. The
issues raised are simply the costs of the interferences as measured by the legislative
purposes or, stated another way, whether the regulation of people's lives is reasonably
justified in terms of sound legislative goals. For us at least, there is no other side to
the issues concerning the older style of welfare or the overtly punitive features of
modern welfare. We think it clear that governmentally imposed badges of poverty,
midnight raids, coercively-imposed celibacy for AFDC mothers, as well as other
repressive conditions of public assistance are impermissible. We would view in the
same way nineteenth-century (and earlier) methods of handling adolescents in trouble
that are still practiced and defended in certain parts of the country today.
For us, the more interesting and difficult issues of privacy arise in the humani-
tarian, progressive programs. This is ironic, but we have tried to show that changing
conceptions of "need" have expanded the legitimate activity of government into
the lives of its clientele. The juvenile justice movement may be viewed as the
forerunner of modern humanitarian welfare. Government interferences under the
humanitarian approach are extensive. They take subtle forms, and, most sig-
nificantly, it is not at all clear that they are unwarranted. Solutions, in the form of
redefinitions of public goals and the formulation of objective rules, are hampered
by conceptual dilemmas and the lack of scientific knowledge. We still know very
little about the causes and cures of deviant behavior, alienation, chronic economic
dependency, and the other characteristics of the dependent poor. Techniques of
changing behavior, whether monetary incentives, education, blandishments, or force,
conflict with deeply held values of freedom, individualism, and dignity. In the face
of practically all proposals for meaningful reform loom the intractable problems of
administration: the sheer volume of delinquency and dependency, the lack of public
support for welfare and rehabilitation, and the lack of professional and institutional
resources.
The dilemmas imbedded in the administration of juvenile justice pose the privacy
issues for welfare. It is easy to deplore the ineptness of police practices, the lack of
substantive and procedural standards in the juvenile courts, and the shoddy treatment
given to adolescents. It is less easy, we believe, to come up with solutions beyond
strengthening and improving the administration of juvenile justice now being prac-
ticed in the more enlightened jurisdictions. We can press for tighter standards, for
more objective rules for administrative officials, and for more and better trained per-
sonnel. Admittedly, these are modest goals, but they may be realistic. And at least at
the present time, they seem better than returning to prior methods of law enforce-
ment.
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Much too can be done with public assistance. Dependent poor (unlike the poor
who manage somehow without public help) are regarded as a class in need of re-
direction. Methods of redirection vary over time-being in one age repressive, in
another idealistic, and in a third professional, operating through enlightened per-
suasion and counseling techniques. Remaking personal habits and reshaping per-
sonalities are constant themes from the earliest days of public assistance to the
asserted professionalism of today."2 4 But "rescue," however undertaken, carries with
it seeds of harm and the ever-present risk of turning a Good Samaritan into a
"pursuing Fury."'25
One method of reducing the bind of the strings attached to assistance is to reduce
the group of dependent poor through the expansion of employment opportunities.
But this method has its limits. Even with full employment, there will always be the
"unemployables," just as we will always have adolescents in trouble. We can also
increase the dependents who receive assistance relatively free of conditions. The
aged, the survivors or dependents of insured wage earners, and the unemployed (to
a lesser degree) receive benefits under fixed formulae with few if any strings
attached. Additional income assistance devices can rest on more objectively deter-
mined standards of eligibility. Discussions of guaranteed annual income measures,
expansion of social insurance, and family allowances point in this direction. Even
though (as already noted) average-benefit or pension-type measures will not wholly
eliminate the need test, 28 more specific statutory standards and better methods of
administration should contract the arena of discretion and the worrisome influence of
official authority.
The expansion of entitlement varieties of income maintenance neither allays
the pervasive concern to avoid subsidizing the indolent nor does it necessarily promote
the rehabilitative goals now embodied in modern welfare. Work incentive still
1" Even measures now regarded as entirely punitive were not necessarily so regarded when instituted.
The Royal Commission for Inquiring into the Administration and Practical Operation of the Poor Laws
(1832-1834) saw, in its recommended measures of poor law reform, rehabilitative benefits to the poor
flowing from the assumed impact of law on personal morals, work incentives, and the regulation of insti-
tutional administration. See, e.g., excerpts cited in DE SCHWEINSTZ, op. czt. supra note 2, at 122-27. Like-
wise, in the United States, the abolition of outdoor relief and creation of almshouses were hailed not
only as tax-saving devices but valuable measures for intellectual and moral training of children. See
REPoar TO THE NEw YoRK LEGISLATURE OF 1824 [YATES REPORT], reprinted in Sos.HONISBA P. BREcKIN-
RIDGE, PUBLIC EVILFARE ADmINISTRATION 39-54 (1938).
I" CHARaS DICKENS, OuR MUTUAL FRIEND 5o6 (Oxford, 1952).
... It may be noted that the number of OASDI beneficiaries concurrently in receipt of old age assistance
has been rising. This trend is attributable to various factors--OASDI benefit levels, rising standards of
assistance for the aged, and also unpredictable and substantial expenses (particularly costs of medical
care). See Eppley, Concurrent Receipt of Public Assistance and Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability In-
surance by Persons Aged 65 and Over, Early z963, Welfare in Review, March 1964, p. 18. Note also
that Congress, in the 1965 amendments to the Social Security Act, not only added title x8 for hospital
and medical insurance (79 Stat. 291, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395-139511 (Supp. 1965)) but also title 19 (79 Stat.
343, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396-1396d (Supp. 1965)), an assistance program based on a means test for the
medically indigent, which may well become the more significant medical care program. See generally
Glasser, Extension of Public Welfare Medical Care: Issues of Social Policy, Social Work, Oct. 1965, p. 3;
Winston, Implications of the 1965 Amendments to the Social Security Act, Social Work, Oct. I965, p. io.
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remains a proper consideration in the formulation of income maintenance programs.
The level of annual income is fixed with regard to wage scales as well as assumed
needs. The level has to balance deterrence against increased proportions of de-
pendents on the public's bounty. Generalized criteria and tax-like methods of admin-
istration will tend to mitigate the privacy issues; but, depending on the level to be
fixed, they will also create hardships in individual cases.
The intertwining of income and service accounts for a major portion of official
intrusion. The phenomenon is old; only the label of "service" is new. As with
delinquency, the service aspects present the more intractable problems. The sug-
gestion has been made repeatedly that the broader services be dealt with wholly out-
side the income-maintenance structure. Rehabilitative goals transcend income
lines' 2 7  The need for service is not limited to the dependent poor, even though
certain ills may be special burdens of poverty. Above the poverty line, we are
content to let individual choice prevail. Literacy training, marital counseling, day.
care centers, as well as other services, are available to those who wish them. The
expanded services for the dependent poor may be voluntary; but, as we have seen,
the connection between assistance and service opens the door to subtle forms of official
coercion. More objective administration of eligibility will not wholly eliminate the
ability of officials to impose their notions of therapy upon recipients; this is especially
true as long as special needs are recognized for individual cases. Fluid classifications
and the ambitiousness of social aims account for the increase in authority in the more
progressive programs.
Again we ask a question similar to that asked regarding the administration of
juvenile justice: Should we separate out all service components from income main-
tenance? It is true that all social classes contain some parents and children who are
foolish and in result an evil to themselves and to society. But we think it superficial
to argue that because government does not attempt to redirect the rich, it should never
attempt to redirect the poor. Better arguments must be made. Freedom might be
maximized but at what social cost? The vulnerable and unprotected may fail to act
or they may be prevented from acting by the oppressive social forces in the slum en-
vironment. Yet official attempts at redirection also have their costs, as we have seen.
Whatever policy decisions are made in welfare, we are imposing value choices on the
dependent poor and our own notions of what is good for them.
""Kahn, Social Services in Relation to Income Security: Introductory Notes, 39 Soc. SERv. REv. 381
(1965). On the probability of separating services from income in public assistance, a goal he espouses,
Kahn remarks:
"... the call for simplification of the means test and some system of flat-grant budgeting in the
assistances would lead the two programs [public assistance and social insurance] even closer to each
other. It may be that reasons of efciency and economy will take us where public re-evaluation ol
recipients is not yet prepared to go." Id. at 384. (Emphasis added.)
